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Abstract
Ranking finite subsets of a given set X of elements is the formal object
of analysis in this paper. This problem has found a wide range of economic
interpretations in the literature. The focus of the paper is on the family
of rankings that are additively representable. Existing characterizations
are too complex and hard to grasp in decisional contexts. Furthermore,
Fishburn [13] showed that the number of sufficient and necessary condi-
tions that are needed to characterize such a family has no upper bound as
the cardinality of X increases. In turn, this paper proposes a way to over-
come these difficulties and allows for the characterization of a meaningful
(sub)family of additively representable rankings of sets by means of a few
simple axioms. Pattanaik and Xu’s [21] characterization of the cardinality-
based rule will be derived from our main result, and other new rules that
stem from our general proposal are discussed and characterized in even
simpler terms. In particular, we analyze restricted-cardinality based rules,
where the set of “focal” elements is not given ex-ante; but brought out by
the axioms.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D01, D71,
D81
Keywords: Ranking Sets. Additive Representation. Categorization.
We thank J. Apestegu´ıa, M.A. Ballester, M. Cohen, R. Echavarri, J.L. Garc´ıa
Lapresta, R.D. Luce, J. Nieto, J.-M. Tallon and the participants at the XII
FUR Conference at LUISS in Rome for comments and suggestions on previous
versions. Jose´ C. R. Alcantud acknowledges financial support by FEDER and
the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia (Project SEJ2005-03041/ECON),
and by Junta de Castilla y Leo´n (Project SA098A05). R. Arlegi acknowledges
financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia (Project
SEC2003-08105), and by Junta de Castilla y Leo´n (Project VA040A05).
1
1 Introduction
Let X be a set of elements (finite or infinite), and consider the problem of ranking
all the possible finite subsets of X. This problem has been an object of research in
a number of meaningful economic settings, according to different interpretations
of the subsets of X and of the corresponding ranking over them. As a few
noteworthy examples, we list the following settings1:
• In the literature about freedom of choice and preference for flexibility, the
degree of freedom of choice (or flexibility for choice) enjoyed by an agent
is evaluated by means of the available opportunity set offered to him, the
feasible opportunity sets being the possible subsets of a given universal set
of alternatives.
• In some social choice situations the social rule that aggregates individual
preferences is a social choice correspondence that selects a subset from a
feasible set of alternatives, rather than a social choice function (for ex-
ample, selecting the members of a committee or club, or deciding on the
qualifications required of candidates for a certain position). In this case,
regarding the aggregation problem, what matters is the voter’s preferences
over subsets of the universal set of alternatives.
• The so-called hedonic games formalize coalition formation problems where
agents are only concerned about the possible partners they can side with.
Thus individual preferences are expressed as preferences over the possible
subsets of the universal set of potential partners. Likewise, in matching
theory, agents typically define their preferences over the possible sets of
agents they can match.
• In some equity analyses a set describes the rights or liberties enjoyed by
an individual (or group) in the society. More specifically, the elements of
the sets could be primary goods a` la Rawls, or capacities a` la Sen. In this
field, value judgments about the degree of liberty and well-being enjoyed
by individuals are therefore made on the basis of rankings over sets of this
kind.
• Finally, in the axiomatic analysis of qualitative (or subjective) probabil-
ity, the events being evaluated for probability of occurrence are sets, the
elements of an event being its possible incompatible outcomes. Then a
set (event) is ranked over another in terms of probability if the former is
(subjectively) judged to be more probable than the latter.
1For a survey on different models about ranking sets, including most of the interpretations
considered herein, and plenty of related references, see Barbera` et al. [4].
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Surely there are other decision problems that admit a formalization in terms
of set rankings. In any case, an apparently very natural way to evaluate a set
would be to sum up the particular values of its elements. In fact, in all the fields
of application mentioned above, additive rules for set evaluation are frequently
found (see, as samples, Gravel et al. [15] in the freedom of choice context, Bar-
bera` et al. [5] in a voting framework, Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6] in hedonic
games, or any of the references mentioned in the following paragraphs for the
subjective probability measurement problem)2. The interpretation of the element
values is straightforward under the different possible cases. In general terms, the
value of an element measures its desirability except in the qualitative probability
evaluation problem, where it is interpreted as the (subjective) probability of its
occurrence.
In this perspective, one may wonder about the axiomatic structure of the
family of rankings that admit such an additive representation. Formally speaking,
our initial concern is the set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a
complete preorder over the finite subsets of X in order to ensure that there exists
a positive real-valued function v defined on X such that A is ranked over B if
and only if
∑
a∈A v(a) >
∑
b∈B v(b). In the qualitative probability setting, the
evaluation of sets appeals to an (additive) measure of qualitative probability for
the events in X that is compatible with the ranking.
It is precisely in the qualitative probability context where the problem has
been most thoroughly explored, harking back to de Finetti [11] and Savage [27].
Savage [27] defines a relation of qualitative probability among sets –events– as
a binary relation that besides being a complete preorder, satisfies the following
three conditions: a) that no set is ever ranked below the empty set, b) that the
empty set is ranked strictly below X, and c) that a set A is ranked over another
set B if and only if for any set of new options, C, A ∪ C is ranked over B ∪ C.
Since these conditions were originally introduced by de Finetti [11], they are
sometimes called the de Finetti axioms. Despite having been conceived for the
particular framework of qualitative probability, they can be easily extrapolated
to the other contexts.
Later, Kraft et al. [17] proved that the conditions proposed by de Finetti
and Savage are necessary for an additive representation of the complete preorder,
though they are not sufficient unless X has fewer than five elements. They also
proposed a new condition that is based on the theory of finite systems of linear
inequalities. This condition, along with the de Finetti axioms, characterizes
additively representable rankings of sets. It was reformulated by Scott [28] in a
more tractable format. Admittedly, the drawback of imposing this condition is
that it is somewhat complex, harsh, and hard to interpret in decisional contexts.
Actually, as Roberts [25] points out, it is “really an infinite scheme of conditions”,
2In the last section we include a brief discussion about the particular interpretation of sets
as opportunity sets, where the suitability of an additive evaluation might be more arguable.
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and Fishburn [12], [13] shows that, as the cardinality of X increases, there is no
upper bound on the number of such necessary and sufficient conditions . Another
drawback of that condition is that it only applies when X is finite.
The awkwardness of Kraft et al.’s axiom motivated some authors to propose
alternative simpler conditions (see for example, Luce [18], Suppes [31], Van Lier
[34], or Fishburn and Roberts [14]), which nonetheless fail to be necessary for
additive representability. Finally, we account for the characterization results by
Villegas [35] and Chateauneuf [10]. Again in the context of probability mea-
surement, they propose axiomatic characterizations of rankings over sets that
conform a Boolean algebra, and for which there exists an additive representation
in terms of a compatible probability measure P : X −→ [0, 1]. Besides the lack
of intuition, which is a handicap common to all this literature, from a technical
standpoint also, these results do not apply to our case because our setting may
not produce a Boolean algebra.
All in all, it becomes apparent that the existing results do not provide a com-
pletely satisfactory solution to the problem we have stated. Our major concern
and motivation is that the existing proposals are based on conditions that are too
complex and lacking in normative content or intuition to be applied in decisional
contexts3 .
At this point we will argue that the complexity of the problem is drastically
reduced if we consider a very suitable restriction on the codomain of the value
function v. This restriction is based on the well-known psychological principle of
categorization. Thus we demonstrate that under such a constraint, a few axioms
that can be easily interpreted within the different contexts listed above are nec-
essary and sufficient for additive representation. Obviously we do not provide a
solution to the general problem (i.e., where the codomain of c is unrestricted in
R). In turn we provide an axiomatic characterization in our particular setting,
which is genuine in the normative sense usually adopted in decision theory and
does not constrain the representation to any functional pattern other than addi-
tion. Moreover, a basic particularization of the model leads to a meaningful new
family of rankings that includes Pattanaik and Xu’s [21] cardinality-based rule as
a particular case.
Our work is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the primitive elements of
the model and presents, motivates and analyzes the codomain restriction. Sec-
tion 3 presents the axiomatic characterization of additively representable rank-
ings of opportunity sets that comply with that restriction (which we call weight-
categorized), provided that a suitable necessary condition is fulfilled for expos-
itory convenience. This results in no loss of generality, but in an Appendix we
3Regarding the lack of intuition of Kraft et al.’s axiom, Gravel et al. [15] is a remarkable
exception containing a reformulation and a new interpretation of the axiom. This interpretation,
however, is narrowed to the particular context of ranking sets as a way to measure individual
freedom of choice. In their model, moreover, the axiom only makes sense under a very particular
perspective of the meaning of freedom of choice.
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present the characterization result that offers a complete solution to the problem
of identifying weight-categorized set rankings. Section 4 explores a meaning-
ful particularization of our problem that is new in the literature, namely the
restricted-cardinality based rule, which encompasses the aforementioned cardinal-
ity rule. We accomplish this independently of the prior development for the
benefit of the reader. Section 5 presents the conclusive final remarks and poses
some questions for future research.
2 The model
Throughout this Section, X will be any set, χ0 will denote the set of finite subsets
of X including the empty set, and < will be a complete and transitive binary
relation defined on χ0. Its strict part  is the binary relation given by A  B
if and only if A < B and not B < A. The indifference relation ∼ is derived
according to: A ∼ B if and only if A < B and B < A.
A categorizing function for X will be any function c : X −→ N such that ei-
ther Im(c) = {1, 2, ..., n} or Im(c) = {0, 1, 2, ..., n} for some n ∈ N∪{+∞}. The
idea underlying a categorizing function is that the agent classifies the elements of
X into categories, where the values of c are the corresponding labels associated
to each category. This fits in with the prevailing principle in cognitive and so-
cial psychology that, especially since Allport [1], considers categorization as the
natural mental process through which humans attach meaning to external infor-
mation. In our case, n represents the number of categories used by the decision
maker to classify the elements of X in terms of their desirability –or in terms
of their likelihood in the appropriate context4. The categorical nature of the
function makes it unacceptable to let the agent have the possibility of attaching
a categorical value of 2 to one item when nothing is going to be assigned a value
of 1, and so forth. We allow the agent whether or not to have elements valued
at 0 within the universal set. In this respect, {(0, ) 1, ...,+∞} has an obvious
meaning: regarding the categorization of the universal set X, the agent has a
potentially infinite, successively increasing, number of labels at her disposal.
We will say that the ranking < is weight-categorized if there is a categorizing
function c for X such that A < B if and only if
∑
a∈A c(a) >
∑
b∈B c(b), where∑
a∈∅ c(a) is interpreted as 0. The interpretation of this rule is clear from the
definition of categorizing function. Another feature that enhances its plausibility
is the fact that cases where c(x) < n for a fixed small n ∈ N admit yet more
meaningful interpretations in certain instances that we are about to advance:
4The process by which n is determined lies beyond the scope of this paper, since it falls into
the field of psychology, or even neurophysiology. What can be said here is that the value of n
may depend on various aspects of the particular decision problem, such as the overall attrac-
tiveness of the alternatives, their similarity, or the decision maker’s capacity for discrimination.
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1. The study when Im(c) = {0} is trivial: it corresponds to the indifference
rule (i.e., A ∼ B for all possible A,B ∈ χ0).
2. When c : X −→ {0, 1} different cases show up:
(a) If c(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X we have the cardinality rule proposed by
Pattanaik and Xu [21] in the context of ranking opportunity sets in
terms of freedom of choice.
(b) The general case has remained unexplored until now and is the subject
of a specific analysis in Section 4. This includes the cases above.
Any weight-categorized binary relation is bound to be a complete preorder,
so we do not lose insight by dealing with such a class of relations throughout
our study. Moreover, such a type of set orderings impose further restrictions.
Particularly, in order to analyze the structure of a weight-categorized ranking of
sets < we explore the implications regarding maximal chains of the restriction
of its strict part  to {{x} : x ∈ X}, which exist by Zorn’s Lemma. They are
associated with the sequence of indifference classes the decision maker is able to
establish among individual elements. We will make thorough use of one of those
fixed maximal chains C, which inevitably agrees with the following Assumption
if < is weight-categorized:
Assumption 1. C is countable and the number of elements that are below any
element of the chain is finite.
This assumption on C sets a limit on the agent’s capacity for discrimination
by means of the strict preference among singletons, but it does not preclude
the case where X is infinite and uncountable. Obviously, the assumption does
not impose any restriction when X is finite. The family of complete preorders
defined on χ0 that satisfy Assumption 1 will be denoted by ξ. As argued earlier,
it contains the whole class of weight-categorized rankings of sets. Thus we will be
concerned henceforth with complete preorders on χ0 that satisfy Assumption 1. By
imposing this restriction, we avoid situations in which the number of indifference
classes among singletons is uncountable, while cases such as {1} ≺ {3} ≺ ... ≺
{2n − 1} ≺ ... ≺ {2} ≺ {4} ≺ ... ≺ {2n} ≺ ... are also banned, because each
singleton must have an immediate predecessor. Other undesired instances, such
as .... ≺ {n} ≺ {n− 1} ≺ ... ≺ {2} ≺ {1} are also excluded.
Remark 2.1. Assumption 1 seems plausible from a descriptive point of view of
individual behavior. It fits very well into the bounded rationality literature and
the very nature of categorization, meaning only that the capacity for refinement
in human perception is not infinite. Nevertheless, at the cost of a loss of fluency,
it is possible to proceed without imposing such restrictions on the domain of
admissible preferences. The reader can check this in the Appendix.
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When <∈ ξ, because {{x} : x ∈ X} = {{x} : {x}  ∅} ∪ {{x} : {x} ∼
∅} ∪ {{x} : {x} ≺ ∅} a recursive argument shows that any maximal chain C
of  on {{x} : x ∈ X} can be written as the union of the following three sets.
The first has the form C1 = {{xn} : n = 1, 2, ..., t} if there is {x}  ∅, and
C1 = ∅ otherwise. The second is defined as C2 = {{x0}} or C2 = ∅ according
to whether or not there exists {x} = ∅. As for the third, it will be a certain
C3 = {{xn} : n = −r,−r+1, ....,−1} for some natural r > 0 if there is {x} ≺ ∅,
and C3 = ∅ otherwise. Under this notation {x1} would be minimum in {y ∈
X : {y}  ∅, {y} ∈ C}. When it exists it is interpreted as the first desirable or
relevant element of the chain. It will be called canonical element and will play a
crucial role in our model.
3 A characterization result
Next, we propose four axioms that will be used to characterize the family of or-
derings on ξ that are additively representable by means of a categorizing function
(Theorem 3.1 below and the subsequent Remark 3.2). The two latter axioms are
expressed in terms of C constructed as above.
• Non-negativity (NN). For all A ∈ χ0, A < ∅
• Independence (IN). ∀A,B ∈ χ0 and C ∼ D such that (A∪B)∩(C∪D) = ∅,
A < B if and only if A ∪ C < B ∪D.
• Decomposition (DE). ∀{xk} ∈ C, {xk} ∼ {x1, xk−1} whenever k > 2
• Equivalent Singleton Expansions (ESE).
∀A,B ∈ χ0, A < B ∪ {x1} ⇔ A ∪ {x1} < B ∪ {x2} whenever x2, x1 /∈ B
and x1 /∈ A.
As shown before, (NN) and (IN) are two of the three axioms that de Finetti
proposes as necessary in the qualitative probability measuring problem. The
former is rather standard and easily interpretable under the different possible
contexts. The latter is also a common property in set ranking models in different
scenarios. It simply says that the addition (or removal) of two indifferent sets C
and D to (from) two given sets A and B does not affect the primitive relation
over A and B.
(DE) allows any element of the chain to be expressed in relation to the first
relevant one. In particular, (DE) says that any singleton {x} is indifferent to a
pair consisting of the canonical element and the one immediately inferior to x in
the chain. The particular interpretation of (DE) in the qualitative probability
framework is that the agent considers the event consisting of the only possible
result {xk} (that he has put at the k-th level in terms of likelihood in the maximal
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chain) equally likely to occur as an event that includes two incompatible results:
{x1}, which he has placed at the lowest level among the probable outcomes, and
{xk−1}.
A natural meaning of (DE) is that the canonical element is taken as a ref-
erence unit to establish the distance between one element in the chain and the
next. That element becomes the standard unit that needs to be added to any
singleton in order to make the resulting set indifferent to the singleton imme-
diately above it. Thus, the axiom suggests some idea of equidistance between
the steps in C. In another sense, and considering that, by identifying C, we are
displaying the individual’s maximal capacity of discrimination, (DE) stands for
the idea that this capacity is uniform along the chain, that is, irrespective of the
degree of desirability (likelihood in the probabilistic context) of the items under
consideration.
Suppes [31], [32]5 uses a related property in his study of necessary conditions
for the existence of a subjective probability measure. In particular he makes
analogous use of his “unduly strong solvability axiom” when restricted to an
equally-spaced standard sequence in the analysis of finite approximate freedom
structures (see also [33, p. 252]): in a broad sense, C plays the role of this algebra
of sets of decisions. Another parallelism is the fact that both in Suppes’ and our
approach, each minimal element of the respective special set is assigned the same
value.
According to (ESE), if we add the canonical element x1 to a set B that
does not contain it, then when we compare the enlarged set B ∪ {x1} with any
other set A, the effect is the same as if we had enlarged A with x1 and B with
the second relevant element in the chain. Though it is an independent axiom,
(ESE) expresses an idea of equidistance in C close to that in (DE). The particular
interpretation of (ESE) in the different decisional contexts is immediate, now that
it has been explained for the previous axiom.
Theorem 3.1. Let <∈ ξ. Then < satisfies (NN), (IN), (DE) and (ESE) if
and only if there exists a categorizing function c : X −→ N such that, for all
A,B ∈ χ0, A < B if and only if
∑
a∈A c(a) >
∑
b∈B c(b).
Remark 3.2. For the purpose of stating sufficient conditions only, the proof
below permits us to check that (ESE) can be replaced by the simpler assumption
of “Minimal Richness”: this amounts to the existence of a ∈ X, a 6= x1 such
that {a} ∼ {x1}. In economic contexts, where scarcity applies especially to the
most desired items, it is not unreasonable to admit that there are many items at
the lowest level of desirability (or likelihood). The interested reader can therefore
produce a simple Corollary under less dull assumptions.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
5We thank R. Duncan Luce for pointing out these references.
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Necessity is proven as follows. If Im(c) = {0, ..., n} then we select x0 = a
with c(a) = 0. Now pick x1, ..., xn with c(xi) = i for any possible i = 1, ...., n.
Then C constituted by the union of the selected elements permits us to check our
claim.
We now prove sufficiency. The maximal character of C together with transi-
tivity and completeness of <, ensure that for every a ∈ X we can assign a unique
label l(a) such that {a} ∼ {xl(a)}, {xl(a)} ∈ C. Observe also that C3 = ∅ in our
notation due to (NN).
Let A,B ∈ χ0. Write A = {a1, ..., am}, B = {b1, ..., bn}. Then, for all ak ∈ A
there exists a unique xl(ak) ∈ C such that {ak} ∼ {xl(ak)} and for all bk ∈ B there
is a unique xl(bk) ∈ C with {bk} ∼ {xl(bk)}. Our aim is to prove that
A < B is equivalent to
∑
k=1,..,m
l(ak) >
∑
k=1,..,n
l(bk) (1)
This would mean that < is weight-categorized according to the weight assignment
c(a) = l(a) for each a ∈ X, where l(a) is such that {a} ∼ {xl(a)}. We denote
w(A) =
∑
a∈A c(a) and w(∅) = 0.
The conclusion is achieved through an algorithm that applies certain steps
recursively until a final stage is reached. Each step transforms (1) into another
equivalent statement. Preliminarily, two particular restrictions are granted. First,
no generality is lost if we assume l(a1) 6 l(a2) 6 .... and also l(b1) 6 l(b2) 6 .....
Second, due to (IN) we can further assume that l(ak) > 0, l(bk) > 0 for all
possible k.
Step 1: We can assume, without loss of generality, that ak ∼ bk′ fails to be true
throughout.
By this we mean: if ak ∼ bk′ then, by (IN) A < B if and only if A′ = A \
{ak} < B′ = B \ {bk′} and also w(A) > w(B) if and only if w(A′) > w(B′).
Thus, the fact that A′ < B′ ⇔ w(A′) > w(B′) holds true is equivalent
to the validity of (1). And this reduction can be iterated until we reach
respective subsets A1 and B1 that fulfill our requirement.
Step 2: If either (the reduced subset A1 obtained in Step 1 for) A or (the reduced
subset B1 obtained in Step 1 for) B is empty then we move to Step 3.
Otherwise, two instances appear: either 0 < l(a1) < l(b1) or 0 < l(b1) <
l(a1). By symmetry we argue under the first instance only. By switching
elements or using (IN), we can assume a1 = xl(a1) and b1 = xl(b1). We insist
that we have relabeled A = A1 and B = B1 only for notational convenience
but the sets we are working on are subsets of the original ones, for which
the property we are to prove means exactly the desired conclusion. Three
separate cases stem from this:
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Case 1: 1 = l(a1) < l(b1). In the event 2 < l(b1), by (DE) and (IN) we can
write A ∼ A′ = {x1, a2, ..., am}, B ∼ B′ = {x1, xl(b1)−1, b2, ..., bn}.
Then let A2 = A
′ \ {x1} and B2 = B′ \ {x1}.
When 2 = l(b1), noting that A = (A \ {x1}) ∪ {x1} and B = (B \
{x2}) ∪ {x2}, we can apply (ESE) obtaining A < B iff A \ {x1} <
(B\{x2})∪{x1}. Then we let A2 = A\{x1} and B2 = (B\{x2})∪{x1}.
Case 2: 2 = l(a1) < l(b1). By (IN) A ∼ A′ = {x2, a2, ..., am}.
If l(b1) = 3, then by (IN) and (DE) B ∼ B′ = {x1, x2, b2, ..., bn}. Then,
let A2 = A
′ \ {x2} and B2 = B′ \ {x2}.
If l(b1) > 3, then again by (IN) and (DE)B ∼ B′ = {x1, xj−1, b2, ..., bn}.
In such a case, let A2 = A
′ and B2 = B′.
Case 3: 2 < l(a1) < l(b1). Using (DE) and (IN) we can write A ∼ A′ =
{x1, xl(a1)−1, a2, ..., am}, B ∼ B′ = {x1, xl(b1)−1, b2, ..., bn}. Let A2 =
A′ \ {x1} and B2 = B′ \ {x1}.
Whatever case arises, it is easy to convince oneself that (1) holds true if
and only if the equivalence A2 < B2 ⇔ w(A2) > w(B2) is correct.
We return to Step 1, and re-label A = A2, B = B2 in order to avoid
unnecessarily complex notation.
Step 3: At length, the algorithm stops because application of Step 2 reduces w(A)
and w(B) strictly. This happens when (at least) one of the following cir-
cumstances arises:
Case 1: A1 = ∅ after applying Step 1.
Under the conventions made this amounts to w(A1) = 0 6 w(B1) and
A1 4 B1, or, equivalently, w(A) 6 w(B) and A 4 B.
Case 2: B1 = ∅ after applying Step 1.
Under the conventions made this amounts to w(A1) > 0 = w(B1) and
B1 4 A1, or, equivalently, w(A) > w(B) and B 4 A.
Case 3: A1 = ∅ and B1 = ∅ after applying Step 1. This means the two prior
cases at once.
We have concluded that w is a utility function for < as desired. 
We conclude this section by checking that there is no redundant axiom in
Theorem 3.1:
Proposition 3.3. (NN), (IN), (DE) and (ESE) are independent axioms
Proof.
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• (NN). Let X = {x, y, z} and let < such that {y, z} ∼ {z}  {x, y, z} ∼
{x, z} ∼ {y} ∼ ∅  {x, y} ∼ {x}. Then, < satisfies (IN), (DE) and (ESE),
but not (NN).
• (IN). Let X = {x, y, z} and let < such that {x, y, z}  {y, z}  {x, z} 
{x, y}  {x} ∼ {y} ∼ {z}  ∅. Then, < satisfies (NN), (DE) and (ESE)
but not (IN), since {x} ∼ {y} but {x, z}  {x, y}.
• (DE). Let X = {1, 2, 3}, and let < be the leximax ordering on the set of
subsets of X: {3, 2, 1}  {3, 2}  {3, 1}  {3}  {2, 1}  {2}  {1}  ∅.
Then < satisfies (NN), (IN) and (ESE), but not (DE) since {3}  {2, 1}.
• (ESE). Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and let < defined by {1, 2, 3, 4}  {2, 3, 4} 
{1, 3, 4}  {3, 4} ∼ {1, 2, 4}  {2, 4} ∼ {1, 2, 3}  {2, 3}  {1, 4} 
{1, 3} ∼ {4}  {3} ∼ {1, 2}  {2}  {1}  ∅. Then < satisfies (NN),
(IN), and (DE), but not (ESE) since {2, 3}  {1, 4} but {1, 2, 3} ∼ {2, 4}.

4 The RCB rule
In this section, the particular case where a binary categorizing function is available
for < (that means c(x) ∈ {0, 1} along X) is the subject of an additional study.
This case leads to very intuitive interpretations and allows us to re-state the
necessary and sufficient conditions of the general case in terms of other intuitive
axioms. The treatment of this topic is independent of the proofs and arguments
given for the general case.
We start defining < as restricted-cardinality based (henceforth RCB) if there
exists Xs ⊆ X such that A < B if and only if |A∩Xs| > |B∩Xs|. It is clear that
RCB rules contain both the cardinality rule (when Xs = X) and the indifference
rule (when Xs = ∅) as particular cases.
Thus any RCB ranking is requested to proceed in two steps: first the elements
in the set are classified into two classes, and then the collections of elements are
ranked according to the number of elements in one selected class. We interpret
the Xs class as a selection of significant or focal elements in X. In most contexts
they can also be interpreted as the subset of satisfactory alternatives6. We could
cite many particular settings where this distinction is meaningful, and where the
content of the terms “significant”, “focal” or “satisfactory” varies depending on
the particular interpretation of the set ranking problem.
Suppes [33] (p.248) already mentioned this kind of rule in the context of
individual liberty evaluation, also making a first axiomatic approximation to it:
6In fact, our binary categorizing function coincides both formally and in spirit with Si-
mon’s [29] “Simple Pay-off Functions”, which only distinguishes between “satisfactory” and
“unsatisfactory” outcomes, and supports many of Simon’s satisficing behavioural models.
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“There are many individuals who are primarily concerned about freedom in a
particular domain, and therefore want the widest possible range of freedom but
only ‘qua’ civil liberties, ‘qua’ economic choices or ‘qua’ something else”.
When freedom of choice is measured by means of opportunity sets (mutually
exclusive options), we find a remarkable approach based on the so-called reason-
able preferences, under which RCB rules are also suitable. From this perspective
the social planner labels an opportunity as socially significant or “eligible” if,
considering the full range of individual preferences that are reasonable in the
choice situation under consideration, that opportunity is best for at least one
such preference (see Jones and Sugden [16], Pattanaik and Xu [22] and Sugden
[30] for details). Under this approach, the social planner evaluates the degree of
freedom of choice enjoyed by an anonymous agent in the society (whose actual
preferences are unknown by the social planner) through the number of potentially
eligible opportunities available to him. Thus, from this position, the RCB rule
would maximize the social provision of eligible options, and ignore those that no
reasonable person would choose.
The RCB rule could also make sense in the qualitative probability measure-
ment problem. Under such a context we would be assuming that for the purpose
of the likelihood evaluation of a set of results, individuals only categorize between
those that are sufficiently likely as to be taken into account, and those that are
not.
In coalition or team formation problems, it is quite usual for the decision
maker to maximize the number of a certain kind of partners (those of his own
party or those who are going to vote alongside him; the number of qualified
researchers in his team, etc.).
Regardless of the interpretation, a crucial feature of our model is that the
set of focal elements is not given ex-ante; its existence and composition are in-
stead induced from the axioms of the ranking over the sets. This departs from
other models like Jones and Sugden [16], and Pattanaik and Xu [22], where the
significant elements are determined ex-ante and for each set; Romero-Medina
[26], where the significant elements are defined uniquely for X, but again in an
ex-ante way; and Puppe [23], who inductively determines the significant element
from the ranking of the sets, but taking into account the set to which they be-
long. Moreover, all these references focus only on the particular meaning of sets
as opportunity sets.
It is simple to check that any RCB rule is weight-categorized since it can be
derived from c(x) = 1 if x ∈ Xs and c(x) = 0 otherwise. The converse is also
true, that is, < stems from a binary categorizing function c : X −→ {0, 1} exactly
when it is an RCB rule.
Next we propose the following properties:
• Symmetry between Significant Elements: {x}  ∅, {y}  ∅ implies {x} ∼
{y}, for each x, y ∈ X.
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• Simple Independence: For every A,B ∈ χ0 and x 6∈ A ∪ B, A < B if and
only if A ∪ {x} < B ∪ {x}.
Simple Independence says that adding/dropping the same element to/from
two sets does not alter the initial ranking between them. This is just a weaker
version of the condition of Independence already used in the previous section.
With respect to the first property, it says that any two elements that are
desirable or relevant as singletons are ranked at the same level. This property
implies that {x}  {y}  ∅ is impossible when x 6= y.
This property probably deserves a more detailed motivation, which would
call for a suitable framing. The axiom is well suited to the “reasonable prefer-
ences” approach, for example. If we are social planners who accept the possibility
that any anonymous member of the society might be either Christian or Mus-
lim, we should not be judging whether allowing him the opportunity to worship
in a church is socially better than allowing him the opportunity to worship in a
mosque. In a similar vein, well-being analysis based on the amount of basic rights
or primary goods tends to reject the idea of prioritizing certain particular rights
(or primary goods) over others. In decision problems that involve evaluation of
other people, individual preferences are very often based solely on binary judg-
ments (whether or not candidates are qualified to be members of a committee,
whether or not a partner in a coalition will use his vote to support certain issues,
etc.). This kind of binary distinction between others also connects closely with
the wide literature on categorization and stereotypes in social psychology.
To finish the motivation of the Symmetry axiom within the different decisional
contexts under consideration, even in the setting of probability measurement we
find a very meaningful context, where the relevant issue is not to determine the
degree of probability of an outcome but to judge whether it is probable or not.
This is the case of the Rawlsian veil-under-ignorance scenario (Rawls [24]), in
which an adequate development of the Rawlsian moral arguments suggests that
any probability or likelihood information should be ignored.
The two axioms above allow us for the following characterization.
Theorem 4.1. Let < be a complete and transitive relation on χ0. Then:
< is RCB if and only if it satisfies Non Negativity, Simple Independence and
Symmetry between Significant Elements.
The next Lemma will be needed in our proof.
Lemma 4.2. Let < be a complete and transitive relation on the set of all finite
subsets of a set Y . If it satisfies: {x}∅ for all x ∈ Y , {x}∼{y} for all x, y ∈ Y ,
and Simple Independence then it is cardinality-based. That is, A<B if and only
if |A| > |B| for each A,B ⊆ Y .
The proof of the Lemma is a simple variation on the characterization of the
cardinality rule by Pattanaik and Xu [21] based on the following guides:
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• Pattanaik and Xu’s model considers the three following axioms to char-
acterize the cardinality-based rule on the domain of finite subsets of Y
excluding the empty set:
– {x}∼{y} for all x, y ∈ Y
– Simple Independence
– {x, y}{x} for all x, y ∈ Y (Simple Monotonicity)
• Considering the subsets of Y , included the empty set, {x}∅ for all x ∈ X
and Simple Independence together imply {x, y}{x} for all x, y ∈ X.
• Knowing that Simple Monotonicity is satisfied in our domain, which in-
cludes the empty set, the reader can check that the original proof by Pat-
tanaik and Xu can be perfectly replicated for such a domain.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
It is straightforward to check that < satisfies the required properties. Now
let us assume that < is a complete and transitive relation on X that satisfies
Independence and Symmetry between Significant Elements. We define Xs =
{x ∈ X : {x}  ∅}. Then, Simple Independence yields
A < B if and only if A ∩Xs < B ∩Xs (2)
for each A,B ∈ χ0. The reason for this is that, since {a} ∼ ∅ whenever a ∈
D\Xs, transitivity of∼ plus Simple Independence entailD\Xs ∼ ∅ and therefore
D = (D \Xs) ∪ (D ∩Xs) ∼ D ∩Xs using Simple Independence recurrently.
The restriction of < toXs satisfies Simple Independence and (NN) -since these
properties are inherited by subsets-, and also {x} ∼ {y} for all x, y ∈ Xs. Thus
Lemma 4.2 allows us to ensure that the restriction of < to Xs is cardinality-based
because {x}  ∅ across Xs. We then get
A ∩Xs < B ∩Xs if and only if |A ∩Xs| > |B ∩Xs|
and this together with (2) finishes the argument. 
5 Conclusions, remarks and topics for future re-
search
We have seen in Sections 2 and 4 that a common framework incorporates some
rules that have either been used in the literature or are both plausible and new.
By doing so we have considered a simple particular specification of the additive
model, which had been difficult to handle in the field under inspection due to
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its unfriendly behavior. The term “simple” means that instead of imposing an
additional functional pattern on the representation, we specify a restriction only
on its codomain.
It is worth discussing the suitability of an additive rule when sets are inter-
preted as opportunity sets. Within this framework, the elements of the set are
mutually exclusive options, and the decision maker has the capability to choose
the final outcome. Then, it is natural to assume that the values of all the alterna-
tives that will not be ultimately chosen should not be taken into account. That
is, the value of a set should equal the value of its best option, as in the indirect
utility criterion of the standard consumer theory. However, we can put forward
at least two arguments that suggest that additivity is also plausible in a freedom
of choice context:
1.− The first argument relates to the view that freedom of choice has an in-
trinsic value. The position that the mere fact of being able to choose is valuable
and independent of the final choice is philosophically well rooted (see, for ex-
ample, Mill [19] or Nozick [20]). From such a perspective, counting the number
of available opportunities in the opportunity set is a way to measure the degree
of freedom of choice provided by it. This is precisely Pattanaik and Xu’s [21]
cardinalist criterion, which is additive and weight-categorized as we have shown.
In this case, the weights attached to the elements should not be interpreted as
their utilities, but rather as their contribution to the agent’s capacity to choose7.
2.− The second scenario, where freedom of choice admits an additive mea-
surement, is the aforementioned reasonable preferences approach. In each situa-
tion therein, the social planner should arguably account for the value of all the
“elegible” options offered to an anonymous agent. Furthermore, unlike in the
cardinalist case, different alternatives in this framework might be plausibly have
different values, depending, for example, on the probability of the option being
chosen by the agent or on the social externalities it may generate.
Regarding possibilities for further research, our approach poses some natu-
ral questions. On the one hand, our specification might ask for interpretations
of cases that we have not considered here, since we have limited ourselves to
studying the binary instance (0 vs. 1) in depth. On the other hand, some other
specifications of the codomain could eventually give rise to meaningful interpre-
tations while retaining an axiomatizable character. We are particularly intrigued
by the possibility of extending our general model in Section 2 in such a way as
to allow c also to take negative values. A particularly meaningful question would
be the following: What axioms characterize Good-Neutral-Bad rankings of sets?
By this we mean the existence of a GNB function c : X −→ {1, 0,−1} such that
A < B if and only if
∑
a∈A c(a) >
∑
b∈B c(b), where
∑
a∈∅ c(a) is to be interpreted
as 0. Such a specification is lacking in the general model in Section 2, yet it is
7See Gravel et al. [15] for more details about the discussion on the plausibility of additivity
in a freedom of choice setting.
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a simple generalization of RCB rules in the same spirit. Then, what is required
in this ranking method is, first, that a classification into 3 classes -good, neutral,
bad- is performed by the agent, and then a “binary” weight assignment is used
to rank the subsets. The interpretation of this rule for ranking sets is clear and
it strikes us as having psychological appeal in many settings, such as coalitions
where there exists the possibility of undesirable partners, choice among opportu-
nity sets where there are “noisy” opportunities, or a voting problem where the
voter not only tries to maximize the number of qualified candidates but also tries
to avoid the presence of undesirable candidates.
Further, one may wonder whether there are certain known particular rules
that can be represented by means of a weight-categorized function. We have
seen, for example, that not only the cardinality rule or the indifference rule,
but also RCB rules and GNB rules, do behave like additively representable rules
(specifically, of the weight-categorical type) and thus the question, in our view,
appears relevant. What can be said about other related rules? For example, the
interested reader can check by means of our characterization that referential rules
from the ranking sets literature, such as the cardinality-first-lexicographic and the
indirect-utility-first rules (see Bossert et al. [7]) are not additively representable
by any weight-categorized function.
Finally, there is some literature on a different interpretation of the set rank-
ing problem that has not so far been mentioned. This is the so-called problem
of choice under complete uncertainty, where sets represent mutually exclusive
outcomes, without any associated probability distribution. Then, any individ-
ual action generates a set of possible outcomes; and the final result depends on
external factors such as nature, chance, or the strategies of other agents. There-
fore, ranking actions is equivalent to ranking their corresponding sets of possible
outcomes. Examples of works that have characterized rules for such a decision
situation are Bossert et al. [8] and Arlegi [2, 3]. However, the additive evaluation
of sets proposed herein is inconsistent with this kind of problems. The intuitive
reason is that the desirability of an outcome (say, “winning 10 euros” (10)), de-
pends on the set where it is included: in this context, the set of possible outcomes
{100, 10} is worse than the sure-result set {100}, so “winning 10” should have a
negative value. But {1, 10} is better than {1}, which would only be possible if
“winning 10” computes positively. Thus, if one wishes to maintain the additive
flavor of the rule in this context, some changes need to be introduced. Bossert and
Slinko [9], for example, propose an additive rule that accounts only for the values
of the best and worst possible results in the set. Another natural approach to the
problem might be to introduce other information about the set in the evaluation
function (e.g., the number of elements in the set, as in an average rule).
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6 Appendix
Here we present the characterization result that offers a complete solution to the
problem of identifying weight-categorized rankings of sets:
Axioms:
• Non-negativity (NN). For all A ∈ χ0, A < ∅
• Independence (IN). ∀A,B ∈ χ0 and C ∼ D such that (A∪B)∩(C∪D) = ∅,
A < B if and only if A ∪ C < B ∪D.
• Countability (CO). Any maximal chain C of  on {{x} : x ∈ X} is count-
able and for all {x} ∈ C the set {y ∈ X : {x}  {y}, {y} ∈ C} is finite.
• Decomposition* (DE*). For any maximal chain C of  on {{x} : x ∈ X}
and {xc} ∈ C minimum in {y ∈ X : {y}  ∅, {y} ∈ C}, then {x}  {y},
y 6= xc and there is no z ∈ X with {x}  {z}  {y} together yield
{x} ∼ {xc, y}.
• Equivalent Singleton Expansions* (ESE*) For any maximal chain C of  on
{{x} : x ∈ X} and {xc} ∈ C minimum in {y ∈ X : {y}  ∅, {y} ∈ C}, then
{x}  {xc} and there is no z ∈ X with {x}  {z}  {xc} together yield
the equivalence A < B ∪ {xc} ⇔ A ∪ {xc} < B ∪ {x} whenever x, xc /∈ B
and xc /∈ A.
Theorem 6.1. A binary relation < defined on χ0 satisfies (NN), (CO) (IN*),
(DE*) and (ESE*) if and only if there exists a categorizing function c : X −→ N
such that for all A,B ∈ χ0, A < B if and only if
∑
a∈A c(a) >
∑
b∈B c(b).
Sketch of proof.
For sufficiency, the proof is the same as for Theorem 3.1 once one notes that,
together with (CO), (DE*) implies (DE) and (ESE*) implies (ESE). For necessity,
note that any weight-categorized ranking satisfies (CO). 
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